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I. INTRODUCTION
Union membership in the United States is declining, and if the current
trend continues, unionization will no longer be relevant in the U.S.
workplace.1 In 2015, the number of unionized wage and salary workers in
the United States remained at a record low of 11.1%, or 14.8 million
workers.2 A wide discrepancy between the public and private sector existed
as only 6.7% of workers in the private sector were unionized.3 However, just
over fifty years ago, in 1954, nearly 35% of wage and salary workers in the
United States were members of a union.4
Over time, low union participation may cause dramatic changes in the
social and economic composition of the United States, especially for its
middle class. The growth of union membership in the mid-twentieth century
is considered to be an important contributing factor in the development of the
American middle class after the Second World War.5 The decline of union
membership has likely contributed to the shrinking of the middle class in
recent years.6 Additionally, scholars often describe the right to unionize as a
“fundamental human and civil right,”7 and the freedom to unionize is
considered to be “among the best means of ensuring the protections of a free
society.”8 Supporters of unionization believe that when that freedom is taken
for granted, “it is a civil right in peril.”9
Opponents of unionization argue that unions lead to higher prices for
consumers, undermine American competiveness with foreign industries,
hinder the operation of a business with overly restrictive regulations, and, by
compelling membership for certain positions, limit freedom in employment
opportunities. There are currently twenty-eight states in the United States
that are “Right to Work” states.10 In these states, a company that is
1
César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An
Exploratory Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 725, 731 (2014).
2
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2015,
USDL-15-0158, Table 3, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
3
Id.
4
GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 23 (2004).
5
Marzán, supra note 1, at 731–33.
6
Id.
7
David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and Civil Right, 9
MISS. C. L. REV. 135, 135 (1988).
8
Id. at 144.
9
Id. at 136.
10
NRTW, National Right to Work Foundation Launches Missouri Task Force to Defend
and Enforce New Right to Work Law, National Right to Work (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.
nrtw.org/news/missouritaskforce2122017/.
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unionized cannot compel employees to become members of the union or to
pay union dues. These states protect employees from compulsory unionism
by prohibiting union security agreements.11 At present, every state in the
Southeast, including Georgia, maintains a “Right to Work” statute.12 As a
result of these statutes, unions struggle to establish a significant presence in
these states. In 2015, only 4% of employed workers in Georgia were
members of unions, and only 5.1% of jobs were covered by a union or
employee association contract.13
In 2014, the labor movement discovered a potential gateway into the
Southeast through the foreign auto industry. In early 2014, the United Auto
Workers Union (UAW) met with leadership at Volkswagen (VW) regarding
the possibility of unionizing the workforce at its Chattanooga, Tennessee
plant. The move would be unprecedented in the foreign auto industry in the
United States. Although the “Big Three” U.S. automakers—General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler (FCA US)—are unionized, foreign automakers operating
plants in the United States have thus far remained union-free.
If the UAW is successful in unionizing a major foreign auto company in a
Southeast “Right to Work” state, it may be able to continue its success and
increase the presence of unions in the Southeast.14 States that have a strong
foreign industrial presence may see a surge in unionization rates among
foreign-owned multinational companies. In recent years, Georgia has
witnessed a sizeable growth of foreign investment in the state. Today,
foreign investment by multinational corporations accounts for a substantial
percentage of Georgia’s economy.15 Among these foreign investors,
11
A union security agreement is an agreement between a labor union and employer that
establishes whether the union may require employees, regardless of their union membership
status, to pay union dues. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under
the National Labor Relations Act: The Statue, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in
Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57 (1990).
12
Right to Work States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx.
13
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Affiliation of
Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, Table 5 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/uni
on2.t05.htm. Among states in the Southeast, Georgia ranks third in lowest unionization rates
behind North Carolina and South Carolina. Id.
14
One way to spread unionization throughout an industry is through pattern bargaining.
Pattern bargaining is a technique in which a union uses the terms from previously successful
union-company agreements in its negotiations with other similar companies. See Christopher
L. Erickson, A Re-Interpretation of Pattern Bargaining, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 615
(1996) (discussing settlements between major automobile companies and the UAW and
examining inter- and intra-industry patterns in bargaining).
15
In 2014, 217,500 workers in Georgia were employed by foreign-controlled companies,
accounting for 6.2% of private-industry employment at the time. The four largest sources of
foreign investment included Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. See Georgia
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Germany has the most facilities in Georgia, with 424 locations across the
state.16 In light of the significant presence of multinational corporations, the
potential agreement with the UAW and Volkswagen in Tennessee may lead
to a push in the labor movement in Georgia.
The UAW has experienced some success in its initial negotiations with
Volkswagen by introducing a plan to establish a European-style works
council in the Chattanooga plant.17 In Germany, works councils are a major
aspect of labor relations.18 By introducing a works council model into its
bargaining agreement, the UAW has gained the attention of Volkswagen. A
series of setbacks in the UAW’s efforts have occurred, many of which stem
from Tennessee’s status as a “Right to Work” state that has, to date, been
largely opposed to the presence of unions. Furthermore, company unions
have been found to be illegal under U.S. labor law.19 Nevertheless, if the
UAW is able to overcome the hurdles and manage to unionize the
Chattanooga plant with a works council model, it may attempt to capitalize
on that success and expand to other foreign-owned companies in the South,
including those in Georgia.
This Note analyzes the proposed works council models at the
Volkswagen Chattanooga plant. It discusses whether the proposed models
are legal under current U.S. labor law and considers the implications of the
introduction of works councils on the future of U.S. labor relations in the
largely anti-union Southeast. The analysis concludes by considering
employee co-determination in the workplace as a product of works councils
and the likelihood of the establishment of collectively bargained works
councils that are used to expand union membership in the union-resistant
climate of Georgia and the Southeastern United States.

Exports, Jobs, and Foreign Investment, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Int’l Trade Admin., http://
www.trade.gov/mas/ian/statereports/states/ga.pdf.
16
Michaela Schobert, Georgia: The Nation’s Champion for Doing Business, GERMAN
AMERICAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, http://www.gaccsouth.com/en/about-us/our-region/ourregion/georgia.
17
William Boston, VW and UAW to Meet for Talks on Car Maker’s Chattanooga Plant,
WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vw-and-uaw-to-meet-for-talks-oncar-makers-chattanooga-plant-1462134557.
18
See Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, The German Model of
Corporate and Labor Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 39–40 (2000).
19
See Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (1993).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Workplace Democratization: Works Councils in Germany
Unlike most law in Germany, which is codified into chapters by topic,
German labor law is derived from several sources.20 Despite efforts in recent
years to codify German labor law, the task has not yet been successful.21
Instead, the law is a result of various national and international sources of
labor law. On a national level, both the German Civil Code and German
labor courts have developed provisions and established legal principles
relating to German labor law.22 Internationally, Germany must follow
directives of the European Union and its associated courts.23 Germany is
also a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).24
Germany’s Works Constitution Act of 1972 (WCA) provides for the
creation of shop level employee groups known as works councils in
individual workplaces.25 German-style works councils may be defined as
“institutionalized bodies for representative communication between a single
employer . . . and the employees . . . of a single plant or enterprise.”26 Works
councils are independent of a union and represent all workers of a plant
regardless of union membership.27 German works councils differ from
unions in that they do not negotiate for wages and benefits, and they do not
organize strikes when there is a dispute between employees and
management.28 German works councils are representative of the workforce
at a specific company, not of an entire industry.29 Today, works councils are
mandatory and encompassing in Germany’s private sector.30 Because they
are representative bodies involved in the determination of a company’s
20
Walter Ahrens & Mark S. Dichter, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 5-1 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 4th ed. 2015).
21
Id. at 5-2.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 5-3 (noting that Courts such as the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights may address issues involving labor).
24
Id. at 5-4.
25
See generally Thilo Ramm, Co-determination and the German Works Constitution Act of
1972, 3 INDUS. L.J. 20 (1974).
26
JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREECK, WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION,
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 6 (1995).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 7 (noting that works councils in other countries, such as Spain and Italy, do have
the power to negotiate wages and call strikes).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 55.
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direction, works councils serve to make employees stakeholders in their
employers.31 Works councils coexist in Germany with industry-wide labor
unions.32 These unions operate as centralized structures with headquarters
that determine industry-wide strategies and policies that are implemented
throughout Germany.33
B. The Illegality of Works Councils Under U.S. Labor Law
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935 to protect
the rights of both employees and employers.34 Section 7 of the Act provides
that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”35 Section
8 of the Act addresses unfair labor practices. Specifically, Section 8(a)(2)
provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”36 In applying the
law, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the United States
Supreme Court have determined that a “company union” is a form of
domination that is prohibited by Section 8(a)(2).37
Today, the controlling case regarding the formation of works councils in
the United States is Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.38 In Electromation, the
employer established “employee action committees” to provide a method for
employees to initiate proposals to develop bilateral solutions for issues in the
workplace.39 The employer was responsible for establishing the committees,
designing the committee structure, and providing employees with pay during
committee activities.40 The Seventh Circuit determined that the actions
committees constituted labor organizations. The court pointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co.41 In Cabot
31

ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 396 (2007).
32
See id. at 404.
33
Id. at 405.
34
NLRB, National Labor Relations Act, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-rela
tions-act (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
35
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014).
36
Id. § 158.
37
See generally NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
38
35 F.3d 1148 (1994).
39
Id. at 1151–52.
40
Id. at 1152–53.
41
360 U.S. 203.
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Carbon, the Supreme Court held that in defining what constitutes a labor
organization, the NLRA intended to include conduct much broader than
collective bargaining in its use of the phrase “dealing with.”42 Thus, the
Electromation committees were controlled by the Act and subject to its
restrictions. As such, the court found that the creation of the committees
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the Act.43 The court looked to the
legislative history of the NLRA to make its determination. The court held
that the language in the legislation “[illustrated] the broad proscription on
employer interference that Section 8(a)(2) was designed to provide.”44
Because the employer in Electromation participated in the internal
management of the committees, supervised the procedure of meetings, and
actively participated in framing the purposes and goals of the organizations,
its actions qualified as interfering with or dominating the labor
organization.45 The court concluded that “the principal distinction between
an independent labor organization and an employer-dominated organization
lies in the unfettered power of the independent organization to determine its
own actions.”46 Thus, in Electromation, the court established a broad net
limiting the ways employers may participate in the operation of a labor
union. As a result, works councils and similarly structured labor
organizations remain absent in the U.S. labor movement.
C. The Attempt to Organize the Volkswagen Plant in Chattanooga
In order to gain a foothold in the union-hostile Southeast, the UAW
proposed establishing what union officials have described as a “totally new

42

See id. at 211–12. Section 2(5) of the NLRA states,
The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
43
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer “to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). Section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012).
44
Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1170.
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form of representation.”47 By late 2013, the UAW claimed to have a “solid
majority”48 of workers at the Chattanooga plant signing union authorization
cards favoring representation.49 The collection of authorization cards is an
alternative form of establishing union representation in the workplace.50 The
UAW, with its proposition of establishing a works council at the plant,
gained the support of Volkswagen’s Global Works Council.51 This support
was key because multinational transplant automakers had avoided
unionization in their plants in the Southeast. Despite the support, the union
had difficulty gathering the majority of the plant’s employees and lost the
representation election in February 2014.
Although the UAW lost the election in February 2014, labor relations
experts still believe that, in time, the Volkswagen plant will be unionized.52
After the February election, the UAW established a permanent presence in
the area with the creation of Local 42.53 At the same time, workers opposed
to representation from the UAW established their own local labor
organization called the American Council of Employees (ACE).54 Each
organization then submitted its own plan to establish a works council at the
plant. The UAW plan involved a dual model where the UAW and
Volkswagen would establish the works council in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). The bargaining process would specify the role and power

47
Associated Press, Majority of Workers at Chattanooga VW Plant Have Signed Union
Cards, UAW Says, TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/
local/story/2013/sep/11/majority-workers-chattanooga-vw-plant-have-signed-/118498.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
If the union, during its organization campaign, gains the support of over 50% of
employees, it will collect and submit union authorization cards. At that point, an election is
unnecessary to establish representation. If, however, the union has less than a majority, but
has over 30% of workers sign authorization cards, there will be an election conducted by the
NLRB. What We Do: Conduct Elections, NLRB (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nlrb.gov/what
-we-do/conduct-elections.
51
Letter from Berthold Huber, President, IndustriALL Global Union, to Volkswagen
Employees in Chattanooga (Dec. 18, 2013); Letter from Berthold Huber, President,
IndustriALL Global Union, to Members of UAW Local 42 (July 18, 2014), http://uaw.org/
app/uploads/2015/09/UAW-VW-Works-Council-Documents.pdf.
52
Jake Holmes, The Latest on the 2015 UAW Talks, From an Expert, AUTOMOBILE (Oct. 2,
2015), http://www.automobilemag.com/news/the-latest-on-2015-uaw-talks-from-an-expert/.
53
UAW Local 42 & International Union, UAW, Vision Statement for a Collectively
Bargained Works Council at Volkswagen Chattanooga (May 7, 2015), http://uaw.org/app/up
loads/2015/09/UAW-VW-Works-Council-Documents.pdf.
54
American Council of Employees, Constitution & Bylaws, 1, http://www.americancouncil
ofemployees.com/uploads/2/2/0/0/22009070/ace_constitution_and_bylaws_10-20-14.pdf.
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of the works council while reserving other responsibilities for the union.55
The ACE, however, proposed the establishment of three separate committees
which, taken as a whole, would establish what it considers to be the
equivalent of a German-style works council.56
In October 2015, the UAW petitioned the NLRB for a new election to
organize the plant’s 164 maintenance workers. Unlike the election in 2014,
this time Volkswagen leadership at the plant expressed dissatisfaction at the
new organization attempt. In a letter written by the plant’s CEO and the
plant’s Executive Vice President of Human Resources, the company stated
that it “finds the timing of this development unfortunate, given the
challenges we are facing as a plant, Brand, and Group.”57 The letter also
highlighted the differences between the requested election and the 2014
election.58 Specifically, the letter stated that “[t]here is no clear path to a
Works Council representing all employees from a bargaining unit
representing only the maintenance team.”59 This new approach by the UAW
would utilize “micro-bargaining” units in the factory.60
Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam commented on the new election attempt
by the UAW. Echoing the Volkswagen letter, Haslam stated that the “timing
isn’t great”61 for the pursuit of a new election. Haslam and other state
political leaders had previously warned against unionization of the plant
during the 2014 election.62

55

Agreement for a Representation Election between UAW & Volkswagen Group of
America, Exhibit B, 2 (Jan. 27, 2014), http://uaw.org/app/uploads/2015/09/UAW-VW-WorksCouncil-Documents.pdf.
56
American Council of Employees, Works Council Concept Summary, 1–2 (Apr. 2015),
http://www.americancouncilofemployees.com/uploads/2/2/0/0/22009070/works_council_conc
ept_apr2015.pdf.
57
Letter from Christian Koch, CEO Chattanooga Operations & Sebastian Patta, Exec. Vice
President, Human Resources, to Volkswagen Employees in Chattanooga (Oct. 23, 2015). The
difficulties mentioned in the letter likely refer to the Volkswagen emissions scandal that came
to light earlier in the year.
58
Id.
59
Id. The letter also highlights the fact that the petition for election was submitted by the
UAW, not Volkswagen, that there was no Election agreement between the UAW and
Volkswagen, and that the outcome would only affect the maintenance workers.
60
The method of collective bargaining in U.S. labor law focuses on bargaining units. Thus,
the entire workforce of an organization does not necessarily have to unionize. Instead, distinct
bargaining units can be formed for specific positions. See Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B.
No. 83 (2011), enforced sub. nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552
(6th Cir. 2013).
61
Id.
62
Mike Pare & Andy Sher, Haslam: 'Timing isn’t great’ for UAW at VW Chattanooga,
TIMES FREE PRESS (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregi
on/story/2015/oct/28/haslam-timing-isnt-great-uaw-vw-chattanooga/332867/.
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In mid-November 2015, the NLRB held a two-day hearing to determine
whether the proposed maintenance worker bargaining unit qualified under
U.S. labor law. The NLRB granted the petition to hold the vote.63 The
UAW also announced that it would be creating a partnership called the
Transnational Partnership Initiative (TPI) with IG Metall, Germany’s largest
trade union.64 The primary goals of the TPI would be to “explore new
models of employee representation in the United States,” to “collaborate to
improve wages and working conditions for employees at German-owned
auto manufacturers and suppliers in the U.S. South,” and to “[e]xpand on the
principle of ‘co-determination’ between management and employees by
establishing German-style works councils or similar bodies to promote
employee representation.”65
III. ANALYSIS
A. UAW’s Proposed Dual Model
Presently, the Volkswagen Plant in Chattanooga is the only Volkswagen
assembly plant that does not operate with a works council.66 As such, in
proposing to unionize the plant, the UAW proposed a works council model
that was “in accordance with . . . the spirit of the Volkswagen Group culture
as reflected in its Social Charter and Charter on Labor Relations.”67 In this
statement, the UAW was referring to the Global Labour Charter signed by
the VW Board of Management, the International Metalworkers’ Federation,
and the VW Global Group Works Council.68 The Charter distinguishes three
stages of participation for Volkswagen employees.69 The first stage is the
right to receive information, while the second stage establishes consultation
63
Erik Schelzig, UAW Taking ‘Micro’ Approach Toward Collective Bargaining at
Volkswagen Plant in Tennessee, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.
usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/11/19/uaw-taking-micro-approach-to-unionizing-vol
kswagen-plant.
64
Press Release, United Automobile Workers of America (Nov. 19, 2015), http://uaw.org/
uaw-ig-metall-announce-u-s-partnership/.
65
Id.
66
David Barkholz & Ryan Beene, UAW Pushes to Form Works Council at VW
Chattanooga Plant, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (May 7, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.autonew.com/
article/20150507/OEM01/150509882/uaw-pushes-to-form-works-council-at-vw-chattanoogaplant.
67
Agreement for a Representation Election, Exhibit B, supra note 55, at 4.
68
See Press Release, IndustriALL Global Union, Global Labour Charter Signed with VW
(Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.industriall-union.org/archive/imf/global-labour-charter-signed-wi
th-vw.
69
Id.
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rights for employees, and the third stage includes rights of codetermination.70
The Charter’s language demonstrates Volkswagen’s commitment to
“sustainable corporate governance . . . founded on a performance-based and
participatory culture . . . to secure and promote competitiveness and
efficiency while also helping to secure and develop jobs and workforce
employability.”71 The UAW’s proposed Dual Model incorporates several
aspects of the Charter, including the three stages of employee participation.72
The UAW proposal states that the works council would be established during
the collective bargaining negotiation between the union and Volkswagen.73
Once the specifics are agreed upon, the works council would be included in
the initial collective bargaining agreement.74
The functioning of the works council would be “guided by” and
“consistent with the terms of the CBA relative to represented employees.”75
The responsibilities of the works council would include making decisions by
majority vote for the good of the employees and employer, representing the
interests of employees in the day-to-day running of the plant, dealing with
complaints and suggestions, serving as the contact for management for all
intra-company issues concerning topics and tasks assigned to the works
council under the CBA, communicating to the employees concerning the
council’s activities, discussing and negotiating ideas and other intra-company
needs with management, acting in a respectful and non-discriminatory
manner, conducting its activities in a manner that ensures compliance with
regulations and adherence to applicable laws, and carrying out operational
management regarding designated matters.76 The UAW also noted that the
implementation of the works council would be a gradual transition, with the
employer retaining the responsibilities until the works council is in a position
to assume them.77 In a later proposal, the UAW included several specific
examples of potential duties of the works council.78

70

Id.
Charter on Labour Relations within the Volkswagen Group, VOLKSWAGEN (2009) 1,
https://www.volkswagenag.com/presence/nachhaltigkeit/documents/policy-intern/2009%20C
harta%20on%20Labour%20Relations%20EN.pdf.
72
Agreement for a Representation Election, Exhibit B, supra note 55, at 4.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 2.
75
Id. at 3, 5.
76
Id. at 5, 6.
77
Id. at 8.
78
Vision Statement for a Collectively Bargained Works Council, supra note 53, at 10–20.
71
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B. ACE’s Proposed Committee Model
The American Council of Employees opposes the UAW as the
representative for the workers at the Volkswagen plant but recognizes
Volkswagen’s interest in establishing a works council model at the plant to
bring it more in line with its plants in Europe.79 Members of the ACE
believe that the UAW was “integrally involved” in the struggles of the
Detroit automakers during the recession.80 The ACE, however, recognizes
the importance of establishing a method of employee representation at the
plant.81 In its constitution, the ACE states that its objective is “to improve
the general welfare of all employees, foster mutual understanding and
cooperation, improve the workmanship, quality and grade of
Volkswagen . . . products, and develop a higher degree of efficiency in their
occupations.”82 The ACE proposed its own works council concept in April
2015 as an alternative to the UAW’s proposal.83
The model in the proposal splits the traditional functions of a single
works council into three distinct committees. The ACE suggests that the
systems “may perform practically all of the traditional works council
functions, fostering communication and efficiency and encouraging
employee participation.”84 The three-committee system would include an
Operational Committee, an Employee Input Committee, and a ManagementStyle Adjudicatory Committee.85 The Operational Committee would focus
on “flow and efficiency, quality, outreach, vendor selection, community
involvement, teamwork, and customer relations.”86 The Employee Input
Committee would provide communication within the plant and allow the
sharing of ideas to Volkswagen.87 The model recognizes that implementing
any of the ideas shared by the Employee Input Committee would ultimately
be at Volkswagen’s discretion. The Management-Style Adjudicatory
Committee would deal with terms and conditions of employment.88 This
committee would undertake certain managerial functions that would not be
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subject to review by Volkswagen other than for “budgetary, financial, or
similar constraints.”89
The ACE, in recognition of the restrictions placed on committees by
Electromation, includes explanations as to why the committees would not be
in violation of U.S. labor law in its proposal. The Operational Committee
would not address terms and conditions of employment.90 Furthermore, the
Employee Input Committee would avoid the “dealing with” concern by not
engaging in “back-and-forth proposals with management,” and it would not
poll employees to determine majority positions on topics.91
C. Legality of Proposed Models
Even if the UAW is successful at organizing the workforce at the
Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, questions will still exist as to whether the
proposed works council model would be legal under the Electromation
framework. Critics suggest that the proposed model is not actually a new
form of representation, but instead is a campaign tactic by the UAW to gain
the support of foreign companies that use works councils.92 Critics
additionally point to restrictions imposed on unions that the UAW did not
address in its proposal.93
Once a union is established as the exclusive representative for a
bargaining unit, it then has a fiduciary responsibility of fair representation.
This prevents the union from placing its own institutional interests ahead of
the employees.94 Those who oppose the UAW proposal’s legality suggest
that establishing the works council would be an illegal transfer of
responsibilities from the union to the employer.95 Accordingly, “any attempt
by a traditional labor union to delegate responsibility to a works council to
negotiate over any terms and conditions of employment, process grievances,
or any other duty of representation, is impermissible under the NLRA.”96
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Critics point to additional factors that they believe put the proposed model at
odds with the NLRA.97
The UAW believes that the critics are mistaken. In response to
suggestions about the illegality of its proposal, the President of the UAW
Local 42 stated that “the union and the company believed the concept was
compatible with state and federal laws, aligned with the UAW’s policies, and
is consistent with the company’s unique brand of co-determination between
management and employees.”98 The ACE also commented on the issue,
stating that “the goal is to get as close as you can without violating U.S. labor
law.”99
D. Implications to the Auto Industry in the Southeast and Georgia
If the UAW is successful and the works council proposal is implemented
into the CBA between the union and Volkswagen, there are various
implications to the future of labor organization in the Southeast. While
Georgia is not home to a German auto plant as Alabama, South Carolina, and
Tennessee are, it has seen a recent increase in German foreign investment.
Among recent developments was the construction of the U.S. headquarters of
Porsche, a German automaker in Atlanta, which is now home to
approximately 400 employees. 100
Georgia would not be insulated from the union’s attempts to expand into
the Southeast. It is likely that the UAW would want to capitalize on its
success by attempting to organize other German-owned auto manufacturing
plants in the Southeast, including several plants in the Right to Work states,
such as the Mercedes Benz plant in Alabama and the BMW plant in South
Carolina. Like Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes Benz have unions with
97
Id. at 24 (“First, a works council would be at odds with exclusive representation; second,
a union cannot delegate its duty of representation; third, a transfer of this duty would act as a
“disclaimer of interest”; fourth, employer engagement with the works council would represent
illegal “direct dealing”; fifth, a works council would likely violate union constitutions and
bylaws; sixth, legal questions would be raised around the appropriate unit; seventh,
professional employees may not automatically be included in a works council; eighth,
supervisory employees could not participate in a works council, rendering the concept
ineffective; and finally, the NLRA prohibits an employer from providing support to a works
council, which would be considered improper domination or assistance.”).
98
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Unlawful, TIMES FREE PRESS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/
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336357/.
99
Id.
100
Press Release, Porche Cars North America, Porsche to Build New U.S. Headquarters in
Atlanta (May 12, 2011), http://press.porsche.com/news/pdf/Porsche_Aerotropolis_release.pdf.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

A GATEWAY INTO THE SOUTH?

5/17/2017 1:58 PM

257

strong influence in Germany. Thus, the UAW would likely attempt to use
the dual model works council as a form of pattern bargaining with the other
Southeast plants. Moreover, if unionization begins to take hold at other
foreign auto plants in the Southeast, it is possible that new investment by
foreign automakers may suffer. For example, at one point Tennessee seemed
likely to be the location of a new Audi plant in the United States. Audi,
however, chose to locate the plant in Mexico, where it would have
substantial labor cost savings.101
IV. CONCLUSION
The UAW has expressed its commitment to expansion into the American
Southeast, and with its moves in recent years, there is no doubt that it will
continue to fight to establish its presence in Right to Work states. The UAW
has shown its creativity by incorporating a works council into future
bargaining agreements with foreign owned companies in the United States.
Achieving cooperation from Volkswagen in 2014, was a significant
achievement for the UAW, but the union has since had difficulties gaining
the support it needs to organize Volkswagen’s plant in Chattanooga.
Additionally, the recent emissions scandal has shifted Volkswagen’s interest
away from the UAW’s organization attempts. Nevertheless, the UAW’s
recent partnership with IG Metall demonstrates its commitment to moving
forward with its new approach. If, in time, the UAW is successful in
establishing a works council in the United States, it may finally gain a
foothold in the Southeast, which would allow it to pattern bargain with other
foreign-owned companies in the region. Georgia, which leads the region in
foreign investment, would certainly be a target for the UAW’s expansion
efforts. Before this can happen, however, the UAW will likely have to
submit its model to the NLRB—and potentially to the federal court system—
to scrutinize its legality. The current, labor-friendly Board may find that the
dual model is consistent with U.S. labor law, but if the composition of the
Board changes as a result of the 2016 presidential election and the UAW has
not yet established itself as the representative of the Volkswagen plant, its
model would likely be found to be illegal by an employer-friendly Board.
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built its first U.S. plant in Georgia, chose to build a second plant in Mexico in August of 2014.
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